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The present chapter describes theory and research in societal psycho-
logy from the perspective of social representations theory. In terms of
research objects, societal psychology is concerned with the study of
social psychological processes as they relate to major contemporary
social issues such as inequality, diversity, rights and justice. In terms of
social processes, societal psychology aims to account for the social and
psychological factors which underlie political and ideological legiti-
macy (see Jost & Major, 2001) and which thereby contribute to the
maintenance of the social status quo or on the contrary lead to attempts
at social change. Societal psychology thereby necessarily articulates
levels of analysis, in particular with respect to the complex relation-
ships between shared ideological beliefs, group memberships, and indi-
vidual thought and action (Doise & Staerklé, 2002).
During the last two decades, an increasing part of research in so-
cial psychology has been devoted to societal issues. Starting in the early
nineties, a number of landmark papers (e. g., Doise, Spini & Clémence,
1999; Duckitt, 2001; Ellemers, 1993; Hoffmann & Hurst, 1990; Jost &
Banaji, 1994; Major, 1994; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994;
Reicher, 2004; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990) and books (e.g.,
Deaux & Philogène, 2001; Doise, 2001; Jackman, 1994; Jost & Major,
2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) have been published which paved the
way for a more social social psychology. These studies and theories
were concerned in particular with analyses of the fundamental structur-
ing principles of social inequality, namely gender, age, education, class,
ethnicity and nationality. They stand for a movement towards a more
societal view of social psychology which has exerted a strong influence
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on a new generation of researchers who were eager to discover less
individualistic perspectives on social psychology than the ones offered
by the dominant individualist or cognitive paradigms of experimental
social psychology. Who could have anticipated, in the heyday of cogni-
tive approaches, that soon the pre-eminence of individualised and
universalist models of human thought and behaviour would be chal-
lenged by models which focus their analysis on the social contexts and
ideological functions of psychological processes? Yet, as we will see,
the claim for a more social social psychology was far from new (see
Cartwright, 1979; Israel & Tajfel, 1972). Only this time, it actually
seemed to spark off a new movement.
In this chapter, we review some of this research concerned with
social issues, and discuss two broad criteria derived from a social repre-
sentations approach to social psychology which can be used to specify
such research. We refer to this kind of research as “societal psycho-
logy” which is eclectic in its epistemological, theoretical and methodo-
logical orientations, but which may nevertheless be circumscribed with
two general principles. The first principle is defined by a focus on nor-
mative determinants of human thought and behaviour. Normativity re-
fers here to the idea that individuals necessarily call upon collective
meaning systems in order to think and act meaningfully. In this view,
psychological processes which have traditionally been explained in terms
of individual needs and capacities (e. g., categorisation and stereotyping
as a result of limited information processing capacities, prejudice to
satisfy motivational needs, self-interest as a basis of human behaviour)
are understood in the context of shared beliefs and cultural values which
regulate social relations. Societal psychology therefore recasts psycho-
logical motives within a normative framework which provides social
meaning to cognitive and motivational processes. For example, ideo-
logical dimensions such as authoritarianism, individualism, liberalism,
or multiculturalism are understood and analysed as shared political be-
lief systems which organise social relations rather than as individual
difference or even stable personality variables (Staerklé, 2009). To the
extent that this normative principle is concerned with the analysis of
the formation, structure and function of collective meaning systems,
we can relate it to the objectification process laid out in a social repre-
sentational approach (Moscovici, 1961/2008; Moscovici & Hewstone,
1983).
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A second general principle refers to social, institutional, and his-
torical contextualisation of psychological processes. This principle is
based upon the idea that many psychological processes (at least those
which are of interest from a societal psychology view such as stere-
otyping of subordinate groups, racial categorisation or meritocratic jus-
tice judgements) are not universal. Such processes may indeed appear
as “normal” or legitimate in some contexts, but as exceptional or unde-
sirable in others. Shared norms and values of some social contexts may
for example encourage and justify discriminatory treatment of subordi-
nate groups, while in other contexts such behaviours are frowned upon
or even legally sanctioned. The scope, frequency and meaning of psy-
chological processes thus vary as a function of social contexts which
provide specific meaning and normative support for these processes.
Groups and social categories at every level of categorisation make up
these normative contexts in which individuals are embedded. As much
as a group of friends creates its own norms regulating the behaviour of
its members, a social category (e. g., working class), a city or a national
society develop sets of norms – Moscovici’s “meta-system” – which
regulate the psychological processes of its members. This second prin-
ciple of societal psychology is therefore concerned with the analysis of
individual- and group-level variation of collective meaning systems. It
captures the anchoring of representations in social contexts in which
group members form, express and justify their attitudes and actions with
reference to salient or relevant group norms.
The chapter will illustrate these two criteria of societal psychology
with examples of relevant research. The normativity of attitudes and
behaviours will be exemplified with a social approach to authoritarian-
ism and to self-interest as well as with studies on the relationship be-
tween ideological values and stereotypes. The model of lay conceptions
of social order (Staerklé, 2009) aims to formalize the multiple norms
which organise social relations and regulate psychological processes.
The social anchoring of psychological processes, in turn, will be illus-
trated with examples of our own survey research on welfare attitudes
and nationalism. But let us start with a few considerations which put
the current situation of societal psychology into a historical perspective.
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Normative foundations of human behaviour
In social psychological theorising, there is a large consensus today that
shared values, norms and beliefs are central components of human be-
haviour (Augoustinos, Walker & Donaghue, 2006; Bar-Tal, 2000; Deaux
& Philogène, 2001; Doise & Staerklé, 2002; Hardin & Higgins, 1996;
Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Elcheroth, Doise & Reicher, 2011). This recog-
nition of the central role of shared knowledge is grounded in a social
theory of the self (e. g., Israel & Tajfel, 1972; Mead, 1934) and reflects
an epistemological stance according to which the self is the product of
social interactions. As members of organised and coordinated social
and political groups, individuals are socially embedded and thus be-
come aware of the multiple norms and principles which organise their
groups. These social norms inform individuals what to expect from other
group members and how to behave in social interactions. They make
social life predictable and understandable, they offer political and ideo-
logical bits and pieces on the basis of which individuals make up their
minds and take a stand on important social issues, they organise group
life and make social groups stable (see Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Think
for example of the norm of politeness prevalent in cultures of honour
such as the Southern states in the U.S. (Cohen, Vandello, Puente &
Rantilla, 1999) which makes interactions between group members
smooth and predictable.
The idea that shared beliefs are important to understand human
behaviour is of course very general and far from new (see Oishi, Kesebir
& Snyder, 2009). Yet, a considerable part of the research which calls
upon shared knowledge operates under the assumption that members of
groups or communities come to consensually share the common knowl-
edge in order to form a cohesive group (see for example Bar-Tal, 2000).
Such a view sees group members as rather passive recipients of group
norms (often disseminated by powerful elites) which they assimilate by
the sole fact of being member of a given group. In early research, such
a view had a distinctively communitarian flavour as the principles guid-
ing the analysis of human behaviour were rooted in similarity with other
ingroup members and in the need to justify and validate one’s opinions
through the support from other ingroup members (e. g., Festinger, 1954).
Moscovici (1972) refers to such a view as the “psychology of the nice
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person” (p.18), a psychology which considers conflict as problematic
and consensus as an ideal to which group members should strive in
order to enhance group cohesion and group efficacy. As was already
clear in the early 1970’s, such a view was the result of a social psycho-
logy which was developed in the socio-cultural context of the U.S. post-
war period in which norms of similarity, assimilation, community and
consensus were the organising principles of social relations (Moscovici,
1972).
In contrast to such communitarian views of shared knowledge,
societal psychology inspired by a social representations approach of-
fers a different perspective on shared knowledge (see Elcheroth, Doise
& Reicher, 2011; Staerklé, 2009; Staerklé, Clémence & Spini, 2011).
The emphasis on shared knowledge does not imply that all members of
a group would consensually endorse the same norms and values. It is
therefore not enough to account for commonalities in values and beliefs
among members of social groups. Rather, it is necessary to account for
debate and conflict occurring around shared knowledge. In this sense,
shared knowledge provides group members merely with common ref-
erences (rather than with common positionings) which allows them to
communicate and debate with each other.
The idea that debate, pluralism and conflict between competing
societal views are key for a societal approach to social psychology can
be traced back to the seminal volume “The Context of social psychol-
ogy” edited by Joachim Israel and Henri Tajfel in 1972. This book is
critical of a non-social and a-theoretical social psychology which ex-
plains social phenomena with individual needs and motivations. The
book therefore calls for a more social approach to social psychology,
forcefully echoed in Moscovici’s (1972) injunction that “the central and
exclusive object of social psychology should be the study of all that
pertains to ideology and communication from the point of view of their
structure, their genesis and their function” (p. 55, emphasis in original).
Unfortunately, following the publication of their book, their call was
only partially heeded, in particular through the impressive developments
of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981) and social
representations theory (Moscovici, 1961/2008, 1988). While Tajfel was
less convinced of the feasibility of a “grand” theory than Moscovici,
both authors deserve credit for developing a distinctively European ap-
proach to social psychology by taking seriously the fundamentally so-
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cial nature of human psychology. While social identity theory created a
powerful conceptual framework to understand how group membership
shaped psychological processes (in particular through the categorisa-
tion process), social representations theory focused on lay thinking,
communication and regulation of social interactions (see Doise, 1990).
It is hardly too far-fetched to argue that outside these two traditions
(and sometimes even inside them) little research within the traditional
boundaries of experimental social psychology was specifically concerned
with societal issues.
It seems today that the call for a more social social psychology has
finally been heard starting in the early 1990’s. We may speculate that
this change had something to do with the breakdown of the East-West
antagonism in 1989 which may have opened up the possibilities for a
more critical and more political view on the social psychological di-
mensions of the organisation of Western societies. In any case, there is
little doubt that during the last two decades an increasing amount of
research on both sides of the Atlantic has been concerned with the jus-
tification and the challenging of social order, with the processes sup-
porting social change and social stability, and with the social mecha-
nisms which make inequalities, discrimination and injustice appear
normal if not necessary (e. g., Jost & Major, 2001).
Yet, the field of a social social psychology is extremely diverse,
and relies on different if not incompatible principles of human behav-
iour. One of the most popular and most influential approaches which
has been developed during the last two decades is system justification
theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004). While this
theory has greatly contributed to bring issues of social injustice and
social inequalities to the forefront of the research agenda in social psy-
chology, the theory has also been criticised for its static and sometimes
defeatist stance since the theory is better equipped to explain the main-
tenance of the status quo rather than social change (see Reicher, 2004).
The main thrust of the theory is indeed that members of subordinate
groups would be driven by their need to rationalise inequalities in order
to make their unfavourable life circumstances bearable. More gener-
ally, the approach is rooted in the tradition of motivated reasoning which
seeks to explain ideological cognition and political behaviour with psy-
chological abilities, needs, and motivations, for example uncertainty
management, cognitive consistency and self-esteem (see Jost, Kay &
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Thorisdottir, 2009). In this motivated cognition approach, the psycho-
logical explains the social, and the individual accounts for the collec-
tive. If the reciprocal influence between these two levels is neglected,
there is a risk that political behaviour such as system justification itself
or protest (or the absence thereof) becomes overly individualised if not
psychologised. A similar point can be made with respect to social domi-
nance theory which is another highly influential framework concerned
with social inequalities and power relations between groups. The theory
seeks to explain the existence of status hierarchies with a compelling
individual-difference variable known as Social dominance orientation
(Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Thus, the explanation of
group dominance seems ultimately to be located within individuals,
even though the theory makes a point of integrating social and institu-
tional expressions of discrimination and dominance.
A societal approach to social psychology takes a different angle as
it emphasises the normative and thus social origins of human behaviour
rather than its psychological origins. This normative approach is based
on social representations theory (see Augoustinos, Walker & Donoghue,
2006). At the most general level, social representations are collective
definitions of reality, made up by shared normative beliefs which en-
able communication, consent and dissent (Doise, 1990; Moscovici &
Doise, 1992). Social representations are constitutive of reality, since
people could not make sense of social realities and communicate and
debate them without common references. Social representations are
therefore not “external” to individuals in the sense that they would ex-
ert an “influence” on them. Social representations organize social rela-
tionships by providing normative reference knowledge – expressed as
“values”, “ideologies”, or “identities” – which make up the symbolic
environment of citizens. The task of societal psychology is then to in-
vestigate the links between individual cognitive functioning and the
normative factors – the “meta-system” – that direct the way people think,
act and interact in society (Doise, 1990; Moscovici, 1961/2008). Un-
like research which seeks to uncover general and allegedly universal
psychological processes, societal psychology is concerned with the study
of the construction of collective meaning systems which regulate social
relations (Doise & Staerklé, 2002).
88 Christian Staerklé
Authoritarianism and self-interest as cultural norms
We will exemplify the normativity of individual attitudes and actions
with a few examples which show how theoretical constructs which have
initially been conceived of as individual level variables have been re-
interpreted as a function of higher order processes and which thereby
change the meaning of the constructs. A first example is provided by
the famous fundamental attribution error (or “correspondence bias”,
Gilbert & Malone, 1995) which from the perspective of societal psycho-
logy is not seen as a cognitive bias resulting from a lack of information
or from other individual deficiencies, but rather as the expression of
collectively held values and beliefs which promote a culturally specific
view of a society determined by free will and individual responsibility
(Beauvois, 1994; Moscovici, 1981).
Let us further illustrate this normative view with two other exam-
ples of classical individual-level characteristics – authoritarianism and
self-interest – which have been reinterpreted in the light of shared val-
ues and beliefs. Following the groundbreaking work by Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950), authoritarianism has been
conceived as a stable personality dimension predicting a variety of so-
cial and political outcomes. People who score high on the authoritari-
anism scale prefer conservative policies, support traditional gender roles,
submit themselves more readily to the orders of hierarchical superiors,
and develop prejudice against a variety of outgroups and minorities
(Altemeyer, 1996; Duckitt, 2001). Oesterreich (2005) describes elo-
quently the authoritarian personality “as neurotic, antidemocratic, preju-
diced, ethnocentric, aggressive, conventional, cowardly, rigid, anxious,
dogmatic, stupid, demagogic, dominant, over-adapted, despotic, sub-
missive, inhibited, etc.” (p. 278). But many researchers have pointed
out that the original authoritarianism paradigm is marred by epistemo-
logical, normative and methodological shortcomings. The personality
view of authoritarianism has for example been criticised as being sim-
plistic, since high authoritarianism is seen as a threat to a democratic
social order, whereas low authoritarianism should lead to a social order
without prejudice and conflict.
In a seminal paper which initiates a new generation of authoritari-
anism research, Duckitt (1989) responds to the personality view criti-
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cism by suggesting that authoritarianism is best viewed as a group-level
phenomenon. Noting authoritarianism’s repeated failure to effectively
predict interpersonal behaviour, he proposes to reinterpret authoritarian-
ism “in a manner […] relevant to collective and intergroup behaviour,
that is, in terms of individuals’ group memberships and identifications”
(p. 69). In this view, authoritarianism reflects the intensity of the indi-
vidual’s emotional identification with a given social group, such that the
higher this identification, the more attached and committed the indi-
vidual will be to the integrity and cohesion of that group. Therefore, high
authoritarians will (a) emphasise behavioural and attitudinal conformity
with ingroup norms and rules of conduct (conventionalism), (b) show
respect and unconditional obedience to ingroup authorities and leaders
(submissiveness), and (c) express intolerance of and punitiveness to-
wards persons not conforming to ingroup norms (aggression). Through
this reconceptualisation of authoritarianism as a group-level attitude, it
has been freed from the conceptual problems related to its status as a
stable personality dimension (see also Stellmacher & Petzel, 2005).
From a societal psychology perspective, the argument can even be
taken a step further by considering authoritarianism as cultural refer-
ence knowledge created out of particular social contexts (Staerklé, 2008).
Thus, when responding to different types of threat, people may refer to
such knowledge in order to interpret the threatening situation and to
take action on the basis of culturally available strategies and discursive
resources. This view is consistent with the conjecture that social repre-
sentations of authority and discipline function as shared knowledge to
which people take up a position (Staerklé, 2008; 2009). Empirically,
this position entails that authoritarianism should not be considered as a
definitely defined personality dimension, but rather as a set of inter-
related arguments and strategies which propose to regulate the social
order through discipline, repression and sanction. In line with this argu-
ment, Perrin (2005) has analysed letters to the editor and has demon-
strated that in the wake of 9/11 both authoritarian and anti-authoritarian
attitudes have increased. This finding suggests that crisis and threat re-
inforces the use of authoritarianism as a common cultural repertoire,
that is, shared knowledge to which people refer in order to cope with
the threat.
Another example of a normative reinterpretation of an individualist
construct is provided by Dale Miller (1999) who analyses self-interest –
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the ultimate individualist motive of human behaviour – as a cultural
norm. In this view, self-interest is perceived by citizens of Western so-
cieties not only as the “normal” explanation of human behavior (“every-
body is self-interested”), but also as the most appropriate justification
(“it’s good to be self-interested”). As a result of the salience of this
cultural norm in contemporary societies, people assume that altruistic
behavior is most likely self-interested, and overestimate the explana-
tory power of self-interest of others’ behaviors, while minimizing its
role for justifying their own actions (Miller & Rathner, 1998). Self-
interest thus refers to a widely shared assumption about the underlying
explanations of human behaviour which leads people to view the world
through the self-interest lens.
Values as regulatory principles of social order
One of the foremost goals of societal psychology, as inspired by social
representations theory, is to overcome some of the dichotomies which
have defined social psychology since its inception at the beginning of
the 20th century. A social representational view requires going beyond a
futile opposition between the psychological and the sociological, be-
tween the individual and the collective, or between agency and struc-
ture. These polarities imply that the individual is pitted against an in-
compatible collective, and that the collective – with a generally negative
connotation – “influences” (or “biases”) the true individual self. In a
normative view of psychological functioning, however, the individual
and the collective levels are not incompatible and should be articulated
(see Doise, 1982): the individual is a product of social interactions and
group memberships, and the cognitive and motivational processes are
co-determined by group-specific, shared knowledge individuals assimi-
late, interiorise, and call upon in order to take up a position and act in
the social world. If, for example, a sufficient number of people think of
the unemployed as lazy and unmotivated, this is not just an individually
held negative attitude towards an outgroup (although it is also that).
More importantly, such a judgement tells us something about the so-
ciety we live in. We could thus infer a number of things from this judge-
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ment: it is acceptable and legitimate to think of the unemployed as lazy,
it is undesirable to be unemployed, laziness is bad, while hard work and
employment is good, and so on. These inferences are culture specific to
the extent that the desirable values (hard work) at play in these social
judgements would eventually not be understood in contexts where un-
employment is less stigmatised and where the free market creed in the
existential necessity of hard work is less prevalent.
Let us now look at values more closely from the perspective of
societal psychology (see Staerklé, 2009). We will focus here on one
particular aspect of values which is central to the issue of societal psycho-
logy, namely the objectification of values into useful and meaningful
everyday knowledge (see Joffe & Staerklé, 2007). Many political scien-
tists share the credo that “ordinary” people are not sophisticated enough
to think in abstract and conceptual terms and that they don’t really un-
derstand the philosophical underpinnings of ideological dimensions such
as the left-right polarity (Converse, 1964; Feldman & Zaller, 1992).
Such a conclusion is only possible when one neglects the fact that the
thinking of lay people follows different rules than the thinking of ex-
perts (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983). From a social representational
perspective, values do not only appear in their abstract form in people’s
lives. This seems actually rather to be the exception than the rule. On
the contrary, values enter people’s lives through everyday communica-
tion and experience, they emerge from social life, and can be evidenced
in a variety of social situations, for example when perceiving and judg-
ing others, when taking up a stance on a political candidate, or when
making sense of TV news. In line with a “pragmatic imperative” of
everyday thinking (Wagner & Hayes, 2005), values become objectified
in order to be useful and communicable and ultimately gain the status
of “cultural truisms”, that is, beliefs that are widely shared and rarely
questioned (Maio & Olson, 1998).
Contrary to the original conceptualisations which see values as en-
during personal beliefs concerning desirable modes of conduct and end
states of existence (Rokeach, 1973), the present view emphasises the
shared nature of values which suggests that a personally held value is
only meaningful when others also hold this value. It is the sharedness of
the value, or more precisely the awareness that other people share this
value, which makes it a common reference for individuals and thus a
potential source for value-based identities. Moreover, values also guide
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behaviour towards others which in turn determines the way people in-
teract with each other. Therefore, values are also seen as normative re-
lational models rather than as individual guiding principles, and thus
are part of the symbolic devices which make coordination and social
order possible.
Values obtain their political and ideological power through the fact
that they assign individuals and groups a specific position in the moral
and social hierarchy of the society (Staerklé, 2009). A powerful way to
objectify values is to associate groups and individuals to value respect
and value violation. Thereby, powerful, successful, high-status groups
come to symbolise status-relevant values such as the work ethic, indi-
vidualism, and motivational commitment (see Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2002),
whereas perceived non-respect of these values is associated with low
status groups, exemplified for example by fat people (Crandall, 1994),
welfare recipients (Gilens, 1999), or women and Blacks in the U.S.
(Biernat, Vescio, Theno & Crandall, 1996; Federico & Sidanius, 2002;
Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher & Tucker, 2005). Thereby, values implicitly
incorporate stereotypical images of those groups who are seen to con-
form to important values and those groups who are thought to violate
these same values, a process termed judgemental value expression by
Henry and Reyna (2007). These examples lead us to conclude that val-
ues are a central concept to analyse the normative regulation of social
relations. Values organise social relations and at a higher level of gener-
ality they participate in maintaining or justifying social order.
The model of lay conceptions of social order
In an attempt to integrate psychological and social regulation in a sin-
gle framework, we have developed a heuristic model which features
four lay conceptions of social order (Staerklé, Delay, Gianettoni & Roux,
2007a; Staerklé, 2009). This model aspires to account for the interplay
between individual-cognitive and social-ideological factors in political
lay thinking. The main idea is that there is a correspondence between,
on the one hand, the ways a social group or a society is organised in
terms of the principles regulating its social order, and, on the other hand,
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the psychological processes and the cognitive operations used to sus-
tain a given social order. This is then a form of homology between so-
cial and cognitive regulation (Bourdieu, 1979; Doise et al., 1993).
Here, we only outline the model of lay conceptions of social order
which is described in more detail elsewhere (Staerklé et al., 2007a;
Staerklé, 2009). The model takes heed of the fact that in democratic
societies the principles underlying social order are debated and con-
tested by both citizens and political actors. Accounting for political at-
titudes with conceptions of social order therefore requires a pluralistic
approach based on multiple definitions of social order. The four norma-
tive models of social order are called Moral Order, Free Market, Social
Diversity and Structural Inequality. These conceptions represent four
simplified ways of organizing a society, along with their main modes of
institutional regulation. To each of these four political models are asso-
ciated specific social psychological processes, for example conformism
or intergroup differentiation. This model is thus an attempt at systema-
tising plural collective meaning systems into a single framework which
simultaneously describes political and psychological processes. It fur-
ther proposes a structure of political ideologies, describes stereotype
content of groups as a function of ideological values (see Joffe & Staerklé,
2007), and associates political meaning to psychological processes and
perceptions. Each of the four conceptions of social order is furthermore
characterised with specific threats a society has to cope with. Let us
now look briefly at these conceptions.
(1) In the Moral Order conception, the social order is based on ex-
pected endorsement of common moral principles. Accordingly, an
orderly society is threatened by norm-violating people such as drug
addicts and deviants who disrespect central moral values (as evi-
denced in conservative statements of lacking moral education and
urban insecurity). The psychological process which sustains a moral
order is conformism, and authoritarianism, understood as an ideo-
logical dimension regulating social relations, captures individual
positionings towards this form of social order.
(2) In the Free Market conception, the social order is based on eco-
nomically liberal principles. Here, the social order is challenged
by people who violate free market principles by allegedly abusing
common goods (as expressed in perceived “free riding” and bene-
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fit abuse by welfare beneficiaries). In this view, welfare abuse be-
comes a political problem and authorities are seen as not protect-
ing the rights and assets of hard-working people. The processes to
uphold this form of social order are equity-based forms of distribu-
tive justice judgements and the belief in self-interest as a funda-
mental human motivation. Scales involving the protestant work
ethic and other free market beliefs may capture positionings to-
wards this conception of social order.
(3) In the Social Diversity conception, social order is based on sub-
group differentiation within national groups, in particular between
ethnic or cultural minority and majority groups. This differentiation
is either positively (as in multicultural societies), or negatively
evaluated (as in societies where discrimination of minority groups
is frequent and legitimate). Hence, the social order is either threat-
ened by racism and discrimination (in the case of positive diversity),
or by cultural diversity and otherness (in the case of negative diver-
sity). In this latter case, individuals endorse the principle of na-
tional homogeneity, they perceive immigrants and foreigners as a
threat and their existence as such becomes a political problem. The
cognitive process at work in this conception is intergroup differentia-
tion on which intergroup tolerance and recognition (on the positive
side) and discrimination and racism (on the negative side) are based.
(4) In the Structural Inequality conception, finally, the social order is
based on egalitarian principles which are either rejected or sup-
ported. When egalitarian principles are rejected, the social order is
dominated by powerful elite groups which control and eventually
exploit subordinate groups. Social dominance orientation captures
such a view of social order. When egalitarian principles are sup-
ported, in turn, inequalities between dominant and subordinate groups
are minimised, in line for example with social-democratic doctrines.
This conception then features the intergroup power relationship
between dominant and subordinate groups. In an egalitarian social
order, the threat stems from social inequality and from social dis-
tance between privileged and underprivileged social categories. In
a hierarchical social order, however, groups promoting egalitarian
principles (e. g., trade unions, “communists”) are perceived as threat-
ening. The processes operating in this conception concern the justi-
fication, or the refusal thereof, of social inequalities.
95Societal Psychology and Social Representations
This model is appropriate for both the objectification and the anchoring
sides of societal psychology. By describing the normative content of
shared knowledge and proposing a model through which abstract ide-
ologies are transformed into useful everyday knowledge, the model is
relevant for analyses of objectification. By providing a priori defined
dimensions – organising principles – which organise social relations
and on which individuals and groups differ, the model is also pertinent
for anchoring analyses. In the next section, we sketch out examples of
the anchoring and the contextualisation of psychological processes based
on the model. We first describe how conceptions of social order are
anchored in low and high-status positions and how these conceptions
account for trust in political authorities. We then report research on
attitudes towards government responsibility across different national
contexts and conclude with a survey study on minority-majority differ-
ences in national attitudes.
Anchoring of attitudes towards social rights
and welfare institutions
The anchoring process is most easily evidenced with the analysis of
individual- and group-level variation of positionings towards shared
knowledge. For example, differences in political attitudes between so-
cial categories reflect differences in social experiences which are as-
sumed to be determined by positions in the social hierarchy (Clémence,
2001; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Groups operate
as norm-generating collectives which give rise to normative beliefs and
values dealing with everyday experiences and contingencies; group
members then draw on such shared knowledge – social representations –
to form political attitudes. Political attitudes such as trust in institu-
tions are then seen as the outcome of a process whereby citizens posi-
tion themselves toward shared normative knowledge (Scheidegger &
Staerklé, 2011). Social representations can therefore be defined as nor-
mative organizing principles of political attitudes (Bourdieu, 1979;
Doise, 2001; Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993).
96 Christian Staerklé
In a Swiss survey study on the legitimacy of the welfare state
(Gianettoni, Simon-Vermot, Staerklé, Roux & Delay, 2010; Staerklé et
al., 2007a; Scheidegger & Staerklé, 2011), we have shown that the feel-
ing of political powerlessness and low levels of education predicted
normative beliefs concerning a society threatened by immorality and
delinquency (moral order threat), by free-riders and welfare abuse (free
market threat), by immigrants and otherness in general (social diversity
threat) and by social inequalities (structural inequality threat). It can
therefore be suggested that membership in low status groups generates
greater uncertainty and vulnerability, while giving rise to stronger per-
ceptions of social problems and a more pessimistic outlook on society
(see Castel, 1995). Low status groups therefore experience greater threat
to social order on all four dimensions. They tend to perceive an unfair,
disorganised, and dangerous world in which authorities and institutions
fail, or have failed, to bring about a better society. It could also be that
such a perception allows materially vulnerable people to see themselves
on the good side of society and thus to compensate to some extent the
potential social stigma associated with financial hardship. Material risk
furthermore produces perceptions of illegitimate inequality which sug-
gests that one’s own experience of financial difficulties raises the aware-
ness of the existence of wider inequalities, and thus of the idea that one
is not alone in this situation (Staerklé, Delay, Gianettoni & Roux 2007b).
In another recent study, we employed data from the European So-
cial Survey IV on 28 European countries in order to test the structure of
the model in an international context and to analyse the various anchor-
ing patterns across social groups (Staerklé, Likki & Scheidegger, 2011.
Based on the idea that political thinking is shaped by widespread nor-
mative beliefs individuals refer to when taking a stance towards wel-
fare policies and government responsibility, we were able to show how
various conceptions of social order – authoritarianism, distrust, welfare
dependency, ethnocentrism and egalitarianism – functioned as strate-
gies to define the moral boundaries and psychological processes of in-
clusion and exclusion with regard to government responsibility and the
protection of social rights.
The findings of this study suggest that the four-dimensional struc-
ture proposed by the model of lay-conceptions of social order (Moral
order, Free market, Social diversity, and Structural inequality) was rel-
evant and applicable to comparative international data. These conceptions
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are assumed to reflect different strategies of differentiation which give
rise to different types of cleavages in society. The results further con-
firm earlier findings from the Swiss study by showing that low levels of
education were consistently associated with greater perceived threat to
the social order, in terms of immorality, free-riding, threatening diver-
sity and social inequality. This finding suggests that people with a higher
level of education are less prone to differentiate people either on a nor-
mative or a categorical basis. Put otherwise, social cleavages seem to
be more salient for low rather than high status people. Material vulner-
ability, in turn, was less uniformly related to normative beliefs. While
ethnocentrism and egalitarianism were more endorsed by materially
vulnerable people, they endorsed less the welfare dependency norm
which considers welfare to lead to a loss of moral responsibility and
social commitment.
Regarding the relationship between conceptions of social order and
government responsibility, we found that perceiving society as a place
in which respect of rules should be improved, people cannot be trusted,
where ethnic diversity is a threat, and in which social equalities are not
met, favours a demand for greater welfare state responsibility and in-
equality reduction by the government. Such perceptions are typically
observed among members of low status groups.
One of the key aims of this research was to explain the contextual,
country-level variation of these normative beliefs as organizing princi-
ples of government responsibility in social issues. This measure thus
assesses the extent to which individuals support a government-based
welfare state based on collective responsibility. With appropriate multi-
level analyses, we found that the conceptions of social order did not
have the same meaning and the same weight as predictors of govern-
ment responsibility depending on the national contexts. The negative
effects of ethnocentrism and perceived welfare dependency on welfare
support were stronger in countries with relatively higher levels of wel-
fare spending and lower levels of unemployment such as Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany and Sweden than in countries with
weak welfare states and high levels of unemployment such as Estonia,
Latvia, Romania, Russian Federation and Turkey. This result suggests
that while on an absolute level ethnocentrism and prejudice is lower in
West European countries than in East European countries, the reverse
seems to be true when it comes to the predictive role of prejudice: Nega-
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tive attitudes towards immigrants predict lower support for government
involvement only in relatively wealthy Western European countries,
while no such relationship was observed in other countries. This find-
ing suggests that the political function of prejudice is to exclude immi-
grants from relatively extensive welfare coverage. Other results indi-
cate that the positive effects of authoritarianism on government support
were stronger in countries with low levels of welfare spending than in
countries with higher welfare spending. This finding in turn suggests
that in Eastern countries authoritarianism is firmly associated with a
desire for a strong government taking care of its citizens. In Western
countries, however, this relationship is much weaker.
These findings point towards the importance of cross-level inter-
actions (between individual and country-level variables) in understand-
ing the perceived legitimacy of institutional intervention. The impact
of country-level characteristics such as social expenditure on opinions
and attitudes can thus not only be observed with different country means
(with rather mixed evidence in the literature), but also with different
weights of normative beliefs in the construction of welfare attitudes
across countries. Put otherwise, the organizing principles of institutional
attitudes vary as a function of national contexts. In sum, the approach
advocated in this research highlighted the fact that the construction of
political attitudes is shaped by the social and normative contexts in which
they are enacted.
Anchoring of national attitudes by ethnic minorities
and majorities
A final example of how context moderates social psychological proc-
esses is provided by another research which focuses on ethnic minori-
ties and majorities in 33 countries around the world (Staerklé, Sidanius,
Green & Molina, 2010). In this study, we were interested in knowing in
which national contexts majorities were more strongly identified with
the nation and supported more fervently nationalist ideologies than na-
tional minorities (excluding immigrants without citizenship). The re-
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sults showed that both ethnic diversity within a country and low levels
of inequality (that is, highly developed welfare states) increased the
difference between minorities and majorities in terms of national iden-
tification and nationalism, while no difference between minorities and
majorities was found in high inequality and ethnically more homogene-
ous contexts. Equality (rather than inequality) and cultural diversity
thus seem to fuel minority-majority differences in terms of their rela-
tionship with the nation.
Another issue concerned the relationship between ethnic (subgroup)
and national (superordinate) identification for minorities and majori-
ties. While we found a strong overall effect according to which majori-
ties establish a much stronger link between identification with their ethnic
group and the national group (e. g., the more White, the more Ameri-
can) compared to minorities. This effect was moderated in particular by
country-level equality (i. e., strong welfare states). Indeed, we observed
that country-level equality fuelled the relationship between ethnic iden-
tification and both national identification and nationalism for majori-
ties, while for minorities this relationship was weaker in egalitarian
contexts. Overall, the findings suggest that the differences between eth-
nic minorities and majorities in terms of national attitudes were strong-
est for citizens who were highly identified with their ethnic groups in
highly developed, ethnically homogeneous and egalitarian, welfare-state
based national contexts. These results point towards a stronger, major-
ity-defined ethnic conception of the nation-state in countries with a strong
welfare state tradition, founded on the primacy of social rights and on
the egalitarian redistribution of resources (in our dataset for example
Denmark, Germany, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic). This
result can be seen in light of research on the relationship between cul-
tural diversity and economic redistribution which has shown that a strong
welfare state calls for the definition of clear boundaries between na-
tional citizens who are entitled to benefits and those who are not (see
Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Banting & Kymlicka, 2006). Our results may
indirectly reflect such a political strategy which consists of demarcat-
ing the circle of beneficiaries by membership in the ethnic majority
group.
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Conclusion
This chapter proposed an illustrated overview of societal psychology.
Two broad criteria derived from a social representational approach were
defined which seem essential for a societal psychology. The first crite-
rion, roughly corresponding to the objectification process, emphasises
a normative approach to psychological processes which should be ana-
lysed and understood in relation to collective meaning systems. On the
group level, these meaning systems organise and regulate the relations
between individuals and groups within societies. On the individual level,
they provide citizens with “lenses” through which they perceive and
explain the social environment around them, and through which they
are able to take action in order to shape the social order according to
their goals. The model of lay conceptions of social order puts into per-
spective four emblematic collective meaning systems which are assumed
to constitute major types of reference knowledge in contemporary plu-
ralist societies.
The second criterion concerns the anchoring of social knowledge.
Attitudes and opinions reflect in complex ways the social contexts in
which they have been developed. Individuals do not passively take up
normative knowledge of their groups. They rather refer dynamically
and through their own agency to such knowledge in order to take up a
position towards a social issue. We would therefore argue in favour of a
social representations approach which takes into account the dynamic
and changing nature of representations, which highlights the debated
and often contested nature of shared knowledge, and which is grounded
in intergroup power relations and communication processes between
minorities and majorities (Staerklé, Clémence & Spini, 2011).
Such a view of social representations is consistent with analyses in
political theory which are based on the idea that politics is an endless
struggle between social categories (such as political parties), aimed at
associating specific meanings to abstract concepts (Mouffe, 1993). The
meanings of “democracy”, “human rights”, “freedom”, or “justice”, to
take but a few examples, are not, and never will be defined in a univer-
sally accepted way. Instead, social regulations and complex systems of
interaction shape the way people interpret these abstract principles. A
democratic functioning of a political community is therefore necessar-
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ily characterized by antagonistic positionings towards socially relevant
topics, that is, social representations.
Societal psychology is also more centred on social objects rather
than on psychological processes as such. This has a number of implica-
tions. It suggests for example that many antagonisms which structure
the field of social psychology, for example between “psychological”
and “sociological” approaches, between “applied” and “fundamental”
research, or between “qualitative” and “quantitative” methods, are not
always relevant and can be overcome. It further relies on methodologi-
cal eclecticism and does not shy away from attempts at interdiscipli-
nary integration, for example with sociology, political science or his-
tory. Meaning regulation systems are not stable and immutable shared
knowledge structures, but are transformed as a function of historical
events, challenged by actives minorities, and altered by political projects
at all levels. Societal psychology is thus concerned with processes of
social change and social stability, and thereby contributes to a social
psychological analysis of citizenship.
Societal psychology is also an invitation to look back at some clas-
sical theory and research in social psychology. During the first part of
the 20th century, authors like Baldwin, Vygotsky and Mead were inte-
grating individual and collective levels of analysis (see Farr, 1996). Then,
in the early times of modern social psychology after WW2, researchers
were driven by their quest for answers for pressing social issues, in
particular in the wake of the holocaust. Both these features – the inte-
gration of individual and collective levels of analysis and the focus on
“real-world” problems – are central a societal approach to social psy-
chology. It is therefore more than worthwhile to go back to some of the
founding work of social psychology, for example social behaviourism
(Mead, 1934) and social perception (Sherif, 1935), intergroup relations
and field theory (Lewin, Lippitt & White, 1939), conformism and group
pressure (Asch, 1955), realistic intergroup conflict (Sherif & Sherif,
1953), and many others. In a way, societal psychology revisits the roots
of social psychology, while taking stock of the enormous theoretical,
methodological and statistical advancements of the discipline since those
early times. That is, it goes back to new roots.
Societal Psychology and Social Representations
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